This course covers selected topics in game theory and economics of information, with an emphasis on economic applications.

Lecture Plans

[February 28]
1. Moral Hazard
2. Adverse Selection and Mechanism Design

[March 6]
3. Auctions
4. Revenue Equivalence

[March 13]
5. Optimal Auction Design
6. The VCG Mechanism

[March 16] *a make-up class on Friday, 14:30-17:30
7. Bargaining I: Alternating Offers
8. Bargaining II: Nash Bargaining Solution

[March 20]
9. Repeated Games I: Perfect Monitoring
10. Repeated Games II: Imperfect Public Monitoring

[March 27]
11. Repeated Games III: Imperfect Private Monitoring
12. Revision Games

References

Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press

Milgrom, P. Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.

Kandori, M., “Repeated Games”, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan.

Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press.

Kandori M. and I. Obara (2010) “Towards a Belief-Based Theory of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: An Application of POMDP”, http//:mkandori.web.fc2.com/

Kamada, Y. and M. Kandori (2011) “Revision Games”, http//:www.people.fas.harvard.edu

Modalités d'évaluation : Grading Based on your short term paper (report), five-ten pages long on any topic related to the course. Details are to be announced later.

Dernière mise à jour : vendredi 23 mars 2012